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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
NELSON CLAYTON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
HAL S. BENNETT, STEWART M.
HANSEN and DONALD HACKING,
as members of the Department of
Business Regulation of the State of
Utah; DEPARTMENT OF REGISTRATION and FRANK E. LEES, as
Director of the Department of Registration,

Case No.

8477

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and appellant brought this action in the
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, seeking a declaratory judgment. The original complaint was served upon the defendants on the lOth
day of June, 1953, and judgment of the court below was,
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at long last, entered in favor of these defendants and respondents on the 7th day of December, 1955. The cause is
now, all in due time, properly before this Court.
The issues were submitted to the court below on stipulation of the facts, as follows :
"1. It is stipulated that Nelson Clayton is a
duly licensed and registered professional engineer;
that he is engaged in the engineering business in
connection with the construction of buildings and
other structures in the State of Utah; that he is a
graduate engineer and architect with degrees in said
professions from the University of Utah.
"2. That Chapter 1 of Title 58, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, among other things, provides that
within the Department of Business Regulation of
the State of Utah there shall be a department known
as the Department of Registration which shall be
charged with administering the law relating to professions, trades and occupations, including the professions of architecture and engineering; that it is
provided in said chapter that said Department of
Registration shall exercise its functions-including
the determination of the qualifications of applicants
for a license to practice-by and through a director
of registration under the Commission's supervision
and in collaboration with the representative committees of the several professions, trades and occupations mentioned in said chapter, including the
professions of engineering and architecture.
"3. That by said chapter it is provided that
the director of registration shall designate, upon
recommendation of members of the profession of
architecture, a committee of three members, each
of whom shall have been licensed to practice as an
architect in Utah for a pe,riod of five years immed·
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3
iately prior to the appointment, and that the names
of the men1bers of said committee so designated
shall be submitted to the Governor for his confirmation or rejection, and that such committee was
so appointed and at all times herein mentioned acted
as such.
"4. That plaintiff applied for and on N ovember 27, 28, 29, and 30, 1951, was given an examination by the Department of Registration, in order to
secure a license to practice as an architect in the
State of Utah. That said comn~dttee, exercising the
power and pursuant to the authority conferred upon
it by said Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, held and decided that under the standard of
qualifications fixed by said committee plaintiff had
failed to pa.ss such examination and plaintiff was
refused a license to practice as an architect in the
State of Utah.
"5. The parties stipulate that Section 58-1-7,
U. C. A., 1953, provides as is alleged in paragraph
5 of plaintiff's complaint.
"6. The parties stipulate that Section 58-1-13,
U. C. A., 1953, provides as is alleged in paragraph
6 of plaintiff's complaint.
"7. The parties stipulate that Section 58-1-17,
U. C. A., 1953, provides as is alleged in paragraph
7 of plaintiff's complaint.
"8. Said act further provides that it shall be
unlawful for any person to practice or engage in or
attempt to practice or engage in any profession,
trade or occupation that may be subject to the Department of Registration without authority so to do
as in said title provided ; and said act lists among
the professions, trades and occupations as subject
to the control of the Department of Registration,
architects and engineers.
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"9. The parties stipulate and agree that the
allegations of paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the complaint are conclusions of law and by entering into
this stipulation plaintiff does not waive the contention that said paragraphs correctly allege the law
and the defendants do not waive their contention
and denial that said allegations correctly allege the
law, and said issues of law are herewith submitted
to the court for decision.
"10. That plaintiff desires and intends to engage in architectural work in the State of Utah without the procurement of a license; that the defendants
have threatened to take criminal action against the
plaintiff if he does so engage in architectural work
without a license and without complying with the
provisions of the above mentioned statutes; that
plaintiff must either comply with the terms of the
statute or engage in architectural work without regard to said statute and run the risk that the statute
may be held consitutional; that if plaintiff engages
in architectural work without a license, plaintiff
will be subjected to a multiplicity of suits and criminal prosecution.
"11. That the plaintiff was examined by the
Department of Registration of the State of Utah, on
the 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th days of November,
1951, in a manner and procedure provided by law;
that the said plaintiff failed to pass the said examination but that thereafter, upon the petition of the
said plaintiff and upon hearing said petition, the
Business Regulation Commission, sitting and acting
as Director of the Department of Registration, State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, did find that the hereinabove referred to Architects Representative Committee did violate a portion of the rules of the Architects Examining Committee in that:
" (a) it failed to complete the inspe·ction of
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the answers submitted by applicants within ten days
after the close of the examination;
"(b) the examination given was conducted
under adverse conditions in that materials and supplies were not ready at the beginning of the architectural composition problem;
" (c) proper preparations were not made prior
to the conducting of said examination;
" (d) and that the applicants were not afforded the allotted time to solve the architectural
composition problem; and that, therefore, said Business Regulation Committee did order plaintiff's. reexamination.
"12. That the educational qualifications of the
plaintiff were, prior to the time of the filing of this
complaint, admitted and accepted by the Department
of Business Regulation of the State of Utah.
"13. That the question of whether the plaintiff was arbitrarily or capriciously denied a passing
grade is not raised as an issue herein.
"14. That plaintiff was, under the provisions
of 58-1-16, granted an opportunity for re... examination, but that the said plaintiff refused and does now
continue to refuse to a vail himself of said opportunity.
"15. That the legal effect of the failure of
the plaintiff to submit to further examination is left
for the court for decision."
It was ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court
below:
"That the plaintiff take nothing by this action;
that the defendants have judgment."
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN THE PROFESSION OF ARCHITECTURE IS A PROPERTY
RIGHT WHICH APPELLANT IS ENTITLED
TO PROTECT BY RECOURSE TO THE
COURTS.
POINT II
AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS NO
POWER TO PASS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LEGISLATIVE ACT.
POINT III
THE DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE PROCEDURE IS A CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR
C'HALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE STATUTES IN QUESTION.
POINT IV
SECTIONS 7 AND 13 OF CHAPTER 1, TITLE
58, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DO NOT
CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DEL.EGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
POINT V
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS ORDINARILY A PREREQUISITE
TO RECOURSE TO THE COURTS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
T'HE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN THE PRO·F·ESSION OF ARCHITECTURE IS A PROPERTY
RIGHT WHICH APPELLANT IS ENTITLED
TO PROTECT BY RECOURSE TO THE
COURTS.
Respondents heartily adopt this Point I contended for
by appellant. In fact, we would go so far as to accept this
proposition as it is stated in People v. Brown, 407 Ill. 565,
95 N. E. 2d 888, 893. That court had this to say:
"A person's business, profession, trade, occupation, labor, and the avails from each constitute
'property' envisioned in constitutional provisions
that all men have certain inherent and inalienable
rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, and that such rights plus the right
of 'property' shall not be taken from a person except
by due process of law."
See also Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 546, 133 P. 2d
325, 330.

POINT II
AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY HAS NO
POWER TO PASS ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LEGISLATIVE ACT.
This Point II, as propounded by appellant, is most
certainly sound in law. The argument presented thereunder
by appellant appears, at first blush, also to be sound; but,
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closely examined, such an argument fails in merit as to the
issues in the case at bar.
Appellant complained in the court below of the statutes of the State of Utah as such satutory enactments affect
his right as an architect to follow this profession and can..
ing. Appellant did not seek, in this cause, a trial de novo
on the issue of whether appellant failed or pa~sed the examination given by the Department of Business Regulation
of the State of Utah. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the said Department of Registration has, at
any time, endeavored to rule on the constitutionality of any
of the statutes from whence life springs for the functions
of that department.
POINT III
THE DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE PROCEDURE IS A CORRECT PROCEDURE FOR
CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE STATUTES IN QUESTION.
Here again appellant states what respondents think is
a proper interpretation of the law. Declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as prohibitive procedures, have long,
if in fact not at all times, been available to litigants in the
courts of this State to test constitutional issues. We need
cite no further authority than that of appellant for this
proposition.
POINT IV
SECTIONS 7 AND 13 OF CHAPTER 1, TITLE
58, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, DO NOT
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CONSTITUTE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
Respondents and appellant here and at this point, come
to a parting of the ways.
Whether the present licensing laws for architects in
the State of Utah have or have not caused a great deal of
dissatisfaction is not here an issue. Future legislators, in
their collective wisdoms, will meet and assemble to make
the laws that will control that situation. Appellant's argument to that proposition is both interesting and enlightening, but not pertinent here.
The issues squarely put and for decision here are "do
Sections 7 and 13 of Chapter 1, Title 58, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, offend against the constitutional guarantees of
due process of law-Article I, Section 7, Constitution of
Utah and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States of America. Respondents think not.
Section 58-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, when appellant commenced this action, provided :
"It shall be the duty of the several representative committees to submit to the director standards
of qualification for their respective professions,
trades or occupations requisite in applicants for
license, and methods of examination of applicants.
They shall conduct examinations at the request of
the director to ascertain the qualifications and fitness of applicants to practice the profession, trade
or occupation for which the examination may be
held, shall pass upon the qualifications of applicants
for licenses, certificates or permits and shall submit
in writing their findings and conclusions to the director.''
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And, Section 58-1-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as
follows:
"The following functions and duties shall be
exercised or performed by the department of registration but only upon the action and report in writing of the appropriate representative committee·:
Defining for the respective professions,
trades and occupations what shall constitute a school,
college, university, department of university or
other institution of learning as reputable and in
good standing.
"(1)

"(2) Establishing a standard of preliminary
education deemed requisite to admission to any
school, college or university.
" ( 3) Prescribing the standard of qualification
requisite in applicants for licenses before license
shall issue.
" ( 4) Prescribing rules governing applications
for licenses, certificates of registration, permits,
student cards or apprentice cards. ·
" ( 5) Providing for a fair and wholly impartial
method of examination of applicants to determine
their qualifications to exercise the respective professions, trades or occupations.
Defining unprofessional conduct, except
as herein otherwise provided."
" ( 6)

Both sections were amended by the 1955 Legislature and,
as amended, enlarge upon the authority of the so-called
"representative comn1ittees." These amendn~ents are not
in issue in this cause.
The constitutionality of the licensing acts of the State
of Utah has many tin1es been adjudicated. People v. Has-
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brouck, (1895), 11 Utah 291, 39 P. 918; State v. Waldram
(1924), 64 Utah 426, 231 P. 431; George W. Baker v. Department of Registration (1931), 78 Utah 424, 3 P. 2d
1082; Moormeister v. Golding (1933), 84 Utah 324, 27 P.
2d 447; State ex rel. Hallen v. Utah State Board in Optometry (1910), 37 Utah 339, 108 P. 347. It has been consistently held that the statutes are constitutional and within
the police power of the State.
Now that the wheat has been separated from the chaff,
we have remaining this question: Does the power vested
by statutes, 58-1-7 andjor 58-1-13, U. C. A. 1953, in the
"representative committees" violate the limitation imposed
upon the Legislature by the Constitutions of the State and
Nation in the delegation of administrative authority? Appellant contends that the statutes are so violative because:
"1st.
provision
architects
tects first

The director or regulation can only make
for the qualification [examination] of
if a board created from practicing archiacts.

"2nd. The licensing power is delegated to an
administrative agency without any standards having
been prescribed.
"3rd. Neither the director nor the architects'
representative committee are required to give each
applicant uniform and equal protection."
Will appellant's contentions bear close scrutiny?
Section 58-1-1, U. C. A., 1953, provides:
"There shall be a department of the state government within the department of business regulation known as the 'Department of Registration,'
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which shall be charged with administering the laws
regulating professions, trades and occupations as in
this title provided."
Under this authority and in the manner prescribed by
58-1-7 andjor 58-1-13, U. C. A., 1953, the department functions in the licensing of :
Accountants
Architects
Barbers
Chiropodists
Dentists
Engineers and Land Surveyors
Funeral Directors
Beauticians
Physicians and Surgeons
N aturopaths
Nurses
Osteopaths
Optometrists
Pharmacists
Veterinarians
Plumbers
Sanatarians
Lawyers have to satisfy the Bar Examiners as to their educational and moral qualifications.
The policy of the law favors the placing of detailed
responsibility in administrative officers. The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that in the determination of what the Legislature may do in seeking assistance
from. administrative officers, the extent and character of
that assistance, must be fixed according to common sense
and the inherent necessities of governmental co-ordination.
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J. W. Hampton & Co.

v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 72

L. Ed. 624, 48 S. Ct. 348. What better sense could be exercised than to have applicants for license in the professions
and trades examined as to their qualifications by persons
learned in the calling?
It is said in 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, page 960,
Sec. 242, that:
"There are no constitutional objections arising
out of the doctrine of the separation of the powers
of government to the creation of administrative
boards empowered within certain limits to adopt
rules and regulations and authorized to see that the
legislative will expressed in statutory form is carried
out by the persons or corporations over whom such
board may be given administrative power. Boards
and commissions of this character do not exercise
any of the powers delegated to the legislature. They
do not make any laws. They merely find the existence of certain facts, and to these findings of fact
the law enacted by the legislature is applied and
enforced."
And, at page 962 :
"An administrative board is not necessarily
using judicial powers if it exercises discretion. For
example, the ascertainment and determination of
qualifications to practice medicine by a board of
medical examiners appointed for that purpose do
not constitute the exercise of a power which exclusively belongs to the judicial department of the government. The same principle sanctions statutes vesting state administrative boards with supervisory
powers over various professions and businesses,
such as the power to revoke the licenses to practice
of those engaged in such businesses or professions,
for both general and specific reasons."
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We now have the general rule.
Appellant says, "Neither the director nor the architects
Representative Committee are required to give each applicant uniform and equal protection." Section 58-1-7, U. C.
A., 1953, provides:
"It shall be the duty of the several representative committees to submit to the director standards
of qualification for their respective professions,
trades or occupations requisite in applicants for
license, and methods of examination of applicants.
They shall conduct examinations at the request of the
director to ascertain the qualifications and fitness
of applicants to practice the profession, trade or
occupation for which the examination may be held,
shall pass upon the qualifications of applicants for
licenses, certificates or permits and shall submit in
writing their findings and conclusions to the director."
The omission of the Legislature of which appellant complains, is the lack of an admonishment to the "representative committee" by the Legislature "to give each applicant
uniform and equal protection." "Vv. .e must presume, however,
that administrative boards will act in good faith within
the scope and power of their authority; and if they fail to
do so, there are remedies for their control. Appellant to the
contrary notwithstanding, the Legislature did provide for
each applicant "uniform and equal protection." Section
58-1-13, U. C. A., 1953, in part provides:
" ( 5) Providing for a fa.ir and zvholly impartial
method of examination of applicants to determine
their qualifications to exercise the respective professions, trades or occupations." (Emphasis added.)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
Secondly, appellant complains of the statutes claiming
that the licensing power is delegated to an administrative
agency without standards having been prescribed. Appellant cites 53 C. J. S. 2d, Section 15, page 508, and concludes
with:
"* * * Where discretion is to be exercised
by administrative officials, proper guides for the
use of such discretion may and, as a general rule,
must be established by the enactment. * * *"
(Emphasis added.)
The same authority has this to say further and immediately
subsequent to the quotation of appellant:

"* * * In prescribing guides for administrative action, the enactment need not cover every
detail, and it need not fix all the: conditions on which
a license may be granted by an official where it
would be impracticable to lay down a comprehensive
rule or tvhere the enactment relates to the administration of a police regulation and is necessary for
the protection of the public. In some instances a
regulatory measure vesting an absolute discretion in
an administrative body to grant or refuse a license
has been held valid, and it has been held to be no
objection to a licensing ordinance, vesting the power
in a city council to grant or refuse licenses, that it
does not prescribe any standards to guide the council in the exercise of this function." (53 C. J. S. 2d
509, emphasis added.)
In an action similar to this and where a declaratory
judgment was also sought, the United States District_ Court
for Idaho had, in part, this to say :
"The general principle granting authority to
the legislature under the police power is that trades
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or professions can be regulated where they effect
the health, comfort and safety of the public * * *.
"The legislature may also authorize a board of
examiners to prescribe and determine the qualifications required * * * unless such qualifications
exceed constitutional limitations and are unreasonable * * * If the Board prescribe fair and
reasonable qualifications appropriate to the calling
intended to be regulated and operating generally
upon all in like situations their acts would be valid.
The principles thus stated are in accord with the
weight of authority."

Montejano v. Rayner, 33 Fed. Supp. 435.
The Supreme Court of the United States (1923) said
this of the issue here :

"* * * a statute providing that any person
of good moral character, having a diploma from a
dental college in good standing, and desiring to practice dentistry, should make application for examination with the dental board, and that all persons successfully passing such examination should be registered as licensed dentists, was upheld against the
objection that it failed to prescribe the scope and
character of the exa.mination, the court saying : 'The
general standard of fitness and the character and
scope of the examination are clearly indicated.
Whether the applicant possesses the qualifications
inherent in that standard is a question of fact. * * *
The decision of that fact involves ordinarily the determination of two subsidiary questions of fact. The
first, what the knowledge and skill are which fit
one to practice the profession. The second, whether
the applicant possesses that knowledge and skill. The
latter finding is necessarily an individual one. The
former is ordinarily one of general application.
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Hence, it can be embodied in rules. The legislature
itself may make this finding of the facts of general
application, and, by embodying it in the statute,
make it law. When it does so, the function of the
examining board is limited to determining whether
the applicant complies with the requirements so declared. But the legislature need not make this general finding. To determine the subjects of which
one must have knowledge in order to be fit to practice dentistry; the extent of knowledge in each subject; the degree of skill required; and the procedure
to be followed in conducting the examination,-these
are matters appropriately committed to an administrative board.'" (Emphasis added.)

Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, 67 L. Ed. 590,
43 S. Ct. Rep. 303 [54 A. L. R. 1104, 1114,
Annotation] .
Respondents think this to be the declared law in this State;
this Court said, in Rowell v. State Board of Agriculture, 98
Utah 353, 99 P. 2d 1, 3:
"That the legislature may not surrender or delegate its legislative power is elemental.
"It may, however, provide for the execution
through administrative agencies of its legislative
policy, and may confer upon such administrative
officers certain powers and the duty of determining
the question of the existence of certain facts upon
which the effect or execution of its legislative policy
may be dependent. McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 203, 85 P. 2d 608; Morgan v. United
Sta.tes, 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 L. Ed. 1129.
Said the New York Court in Elite Dairy Products v.
Ten Eyek, 271 N. Y. 488, 3 N. E. 2d 606, 609: 'The
Legislature may properly authorize an administrative officer to * * * determine questions of
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fact. Any discretion there left to the administrative
officer is confined to a designated field, and within
that field rests, not upon unfettered choice, but
upon the application of rules of reason to facts
proven or found.' "
The "representative committees," the duties of which are
set forth in 58-1-7, U. C. A., 1953, are the "fact finders"
and the delegation of that authority is in no wise repugnant
to the Constitution in so-called "police power legislation."
Finally, your appellant complains of the provision of
the statute that "expressly provides that the director may
fix the qualifications and do the other things enumerated
in Section 58-1-13 only upon the action and report in writing of the appropriate representative committee. So, as
appellant says, "If the board of architects takes no action
at all, the director could not prescribe any qualifications."
The complete answer to that is that the board of architects
did and have acted; that it must be presumed that a public
official will perform his duties; and, that where there is
a failure of performance or even where there is an arbitrary exercise of discretion or judgment by an officer, a
writ of mandamus may issue to require the performance of
his duty. City of Wewoka v. Rose Lawn Dairy, (Okla.),
212 P. 2d 1056, 1059.
POINT V
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS ORDINARILY A PREREQUISITE
TO RECOURSE TO THE COURTS.
The court below found :
"That the plaintiff has failed, neglected and refused to exhaust his administrative remedies."
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Section 58-1-16 of the act provides:
"Whenever the director is satisfied that substantial justice has not been done in an examination,
he may order a reexamination either before the same
committee or another committee appointed for that
purpose."
Appellant made application for re-examination under this
provision of the statute. The ruling was in appellant's favor
and a further examination [as to those sections which appellant had failed] was ordered ; appellant declined and
chose to seek relief through the courts. Respondents think
that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is ordinarily
a prerequisite to recourse to the courts. We cite the Colorado case of Heron v. City of Denver (1955), 283 P. 2d 647,
650, wherein that court said :
"* * * Where administrative remedies are
provided, this policy of orderly procedure should be
followed, particularly when the matter of which
complaint is made, or by which the party is aggrieved, is such as is within the province of the administrative authority to correct. Unless the administrative remedies are exhausted it never can be
known but what a correction would ensue if the
authorities were given full opportunity to pass upon
the matter."
CONCLUSION
Appellant should go hence and with naught; respondents should have their costs.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Respondents.
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